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Abstract
This study examines how extraversion, a personality trait that signifies more or
less positive affect, assertive behavior, decisive thinking, and desires for social
engagement, influences chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) decisions and the
ensuing strategic behavior of firms. Using a novel linguistic technique to assess
personality from unscripted text spoken by 2,381 CEOs of S&P 1500 firms over
ten years, we show that CEOs’ extraversion influences the merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) behavior of firms above and beyond other well-established person-
ality traits. We find that extraverted CEOs are more likely to engage in
acquisitions, and to conduct larger ones, than other CEOs and that these
effects are partially explained by their higher representation on boards of other
firms. Moreover, we find that the acquisitive nature of extraverted CEOs
reveals itself particularly in so-called ‘‘weaker’’ situations, in which CEOs enjoy
considerable discretion to behave in ways akin to their personality traits.
Subsequent analyses show that extraverted CEOs are also more likely than
other CEOs to succeed in M&As, as reflected by stronger abnormal returns fol-
lowing acquisition announcements.
Keywords: personality, chief executive officers, mergers and acquisitions,
extraversion
The personalities of chief executive officers (CEOs) affect not only their own
individual behavior but also the behavior of the firms they lead (e.g., Hambrick
and Mason, 1984; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). A dominant area in the field of
strategic management focuses on the role of top executives in consequential
strategic choices, such as engaging in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). For
CEOs, the choice to acquire involves many decisions, such as whether, what,
when, and for how much to acquire. As outcomes are highly uncertain and
ambiguous, and opportunity costs are difficult to determine, there is consider-
able room for subjective influences in the form of personal preferences, biases,
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and personality (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011; Zhu, 2013; Malhotra,
Zhu, and Reus, 2015). This has led scholars to study a wide range of CEO fea-
tures, such as how CEOs’ self-interested motivations (e.g., Sanders, 2001),
hubris or overconfidence (Roll, 1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997;
Malmendier and Tate, 2008), narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), regu-
latory focus (Gamache et al., 2015), and even testosterone levels (Levi, Li, and
Zhang, 2010) influence M&A activity.
Yet while scholars agree that a CEO’s personality matters, there are at least
three important shortcomings in our current knowledge. First, there is little sys-
tematic research on theories of core personality traits (for important excep-
tions, see Peterson et al., 2003; Giberson et al., 2009; Nadkarni and Herrmann,
2010; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). Considering that the trait of extraversion
is central in leadership research (e.g., Bono and Judge, 2004), it is particularly
surprising that there is limited research on CEOs’ extraversion. Extraversion is
one of the Big Five personality traits, the others being openness, conscientious-
ness, agreeableness, and emotional stability (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990;
Costa and McCrae, 1992, 2008; John and Srivastava, 1999). Extraversion
reflects a tendency for positive affect, assertive behavior, decisive thinking, and
a desire for social engagement (Wilt and Revelle, 2009, 2016)—characteristics
that may help explain why extraverted CEOs seek and enjoy large-scale growth
opportunities, spot such growth opportunities more readily than other CEOs,
view them more positively, and are more likely to transform these opportuni-
ties into collective action. We expect extraverted CEOs to have a more acquisi-
tive nature than other CEOs.
Second, though scholars have linked CEOs’ personality to firms’ behavior,
the mechanisms through which this link can be explained are rarely examined
empirically. We examine CEOs’ representation on boards as one potentially
important mediating mechanism: because of their assertiveness, ambition, and
desire for social engagement, extraverted CEOs are likely to seek out and
attain more board memberships, which provide valuable information and how-
to knowledge for CEOs to identify and act on potential acquisition opportunities
quickly. Therefore we examine empirically whether the size of CEOs’ board
networks partially explains why CEOs’ extraversion influences M&A behavior.
Third, there is limited understanding of when a CEO’s personality matters,
which is surprising because personality scholars generally agree that behavior
is a joint function of individual differences and situational characteristics (e.g.,
Mischel, 1977a, 1977b). The influence of personality depends on situational
strength—i.e., whether the situation prescribes formal and informal rules that
constrain people in their behavioral options (Mischel, 1977b). For CEOs, situa-
tional strength likely constrains the influence of personality not only on individ-
ual behavior but also on firms’ behavior. We consider two ‘‘weak’’ situations in
which CEOs’ personality will have a stronger influence on M&A behavior:
reduced competition and high levels of managerial entrenchment.
Another important and related question is whether CEOs’ extraversion influ-
ences M&A performance. Since the M&A boom of the 1990s, firms have spent
trillions of dollars on M&As, even though many M&As have destroyed value
(e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005). An underlying theme in the
M&A literature therefore has been which CEO personality dimensions might
help explain the large destruction of value through M&As. CEOs’ hubris and
narcissism are palpable examples, and previous research has shown that these
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personality dimensions can lead to higher M&A premiums or irregular perfor-
mance (e.g., Roll, 1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Chatterjee and
Hambrick, 2007). In contrast, extraversion has been linked to effective and
transformational leadership (e.g., Bono and Judge, 2004; Do and Misbashian,
2014). Thus we explore whether extraverted CEOs are not only more likely to
engage in M&As but are also more likely to create rather than destroy value
through M&As.
Most studies on CEO personality have been limited to small samples and
specific industries or have used remote proxies, limiting generalizability.
Clearly, it is difficult to obtain in-depth personality assessments or self-
assessments from busy top executives, although Nadkarni and Herrmann
(2010) and Hermann and Nadkarni (2014) were able to obtain Big Five personal-
ity scores through self-report surveys of Indian and Ecuadorian CEOs. For our
own study, recent developments in computer programming gave us the oppor-
tunity to use a novel technique to study a large, cross-industry sample of 2,381
CEOs of S&P 1500 firms. We obtained non-scripted conversations between
CEOs and shareholders over a ten-year period (2002–2012) and ran a linguistic
application, resulting in a unique database of CEOs’ personality scores. Using
these data, we examine whether, why, and when CEO extraversion might
influence M&A behavior, also providing insight into how CEOs’ extraversion is
related to value creation following M&As.
THEORY
Extraversion and Leadership
Extraversion is a fundamental personality trait, but the concept and what con-
stitutes it have evolved considerably over time (for reviews, see Watson and
Clark, 1997; John and Srivastava, 1999; Wilt and Revelle, 2009, 2016). In their
reviews of the extraversion literature, Wilt and Revelle (2009, 2016) built on the
notion that personality traits are abstractions that describe coherence in affect,
behavior, cognition, and desire (the ‘‘ABCD’’ of personality). They explained
that extraversion reflects the likelihood that people experience or display posi-
tive affect, assertive behavior, decisive thinking, and desires for social engage-
ment and attention.1 Positive affect is a tendency to experience more positive
than negative emotions, such as excitement and happiness, which some scho-
lars suggest is the glue that holds together extraversion’s lower-order facets of
affiliation, energy, and ascendency (Tellegen, 1985; Watson and Clark, 1997).
Other scholars have emphasized extraverts’ assertive behavior, stemming from
their inclination to display approach behavior rather than avoidance behavior
(e.g., John and Srivastava, 1999). In their Five Factor Model, Costa and McCrae
(1992) emphasized that while a disposition to engage in social behavior explains
lower-order facets of warmth and gregariousness, it also explains assertive-
ness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotion. Moreover, extraverts,
through their social dispositions, influence the behaviors and emotions of oth-
ers and thus create a more positive social environment around them (Eaton
and Funder, 2003). In terms of cognition, scholars have linked extraversion to
1 Although early research also associated impulsivity with extraversion (e.g., Eysenck, 1959;
Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975), there is now general agreement that the two should be viewed as
independent (Watson and Clark, 1997).
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people’s tendency to view neutral environments more positively (Uziel, 2006)
and recognize positive stimuli more quickly (Robinson, 2007). Extraverts are
also more decisive than other people (Wilt and Revelle, 2016)—their ability to
deal with situations in which multiple stimuli compete for attention may explain
why they are more likely to excel in complex environments (Matthews, Deary,
and Whiteman, 2003).
Reflecting on these variations, several scholars have argued that desires for
interpersonal engagement that characterize extraverts have two components
(e.g., Tellegen, 1985; Wiggins, 1991; Depue and Collins, 1999; Morrone-
Strupinsky and Lane, 2007). First, affiliation captures ‘‘getting along’’ tenden-
cies, including enjoying and valuing close interpersonal bonds, and being warm
and affectionate, as reflected in lower-order facets such as gregariousness
(Costa and McCrae, 1985), social closeness (Depue and Collins, 1999), and
sociability (Guilford and Zimmerman, 1947). Second, agency refers to ‘‘getting
ahead’’ tendencies, including enjoying and valuing being a differentiated individ-
ual within a social group, as reflected in lower-order facets such as urgency or
ambition (Hogan, 1983; Costa and McCrae, 1985), social potency (Depue and
Collins, 1999), and ascendance (Guilford and Zimmerman, 1947).
Of the Big Five personality traits, extraversion is the strongest and most con-
sistent predictor of leadership emergence and of transformational and effective
leadership (Judge et al., 2002; Bono and Judge, 2004). A recent meta-analysis
indicated that this effect on leadership outcomes is due to the agentic facets of
extraversion (Do and Minbashian, 2014). Affiliative and agentic tendencies both
concern a desire for and sensitivity to social engagement, yet there are impor-
tant motivational and emotional differences. Affiliation captures efforts to socia-
lize and to achieve close connections for their own sake, regardless of whether
they help with achieving organizational or work-related goals. After controlling
for agentic aspects, such affiliative aspects of extraversion are unrelated to
transformational leadership and are negatively related to effective leadership,
perhaps because efforts to get along may prevent leaders from making difficult
decisions that are often necessary to lead effectively (Do and Minbashian,
2014). In contrast, agency captures a tendency toward social ascendancy that
prompts extraverts to achieve social connections not only for their own sake
but also to influence and persuade others to pursue collective goals (Depue
and Collins, 1999; Morrone-Strupinsky and Depue, 2004). Moreover, agency is
associated with highly activated emotional states, such as excitement, joy,
energy, and confidence (Watson and Clark, 1997), which allow extraverts to
inspire others by conveying an optimistic vision and to display an intense enthu-
siasm for how to achieve that vision. There is some evidence that these con-
trasting effects between agentic and affiliative aspects of extraversion may
become more pronounced for top managers (Do and Misbashian, 2014).
Given that extraversion is the strongest and most consistent personality pre-
dictor of effective and transformational leadership, it is surprising that scant
research has investigated the role of CEOs’ extraversion. A few studies have
underscored its relevance, as scholars have found that CEOs’ extraversion is
related to top management teams’ perceptions of CEOs’ dominance (Peterson
et al., 2003) and to a firm’s strategic flexibility and strategic change initiatives
(Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014).
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CEO Personality and M&As
In his seminal work, Roll (1986: 199) stressed that although economists’
assumption of rationality may hold under many conditions, it should be aban-
doned for M&As because ‘‘takeovers reflect individual decisions.’’ In pursuit of
M&As, senior management, and CEOs in particular, seem to have considerable
latitude. For this reason, a dominant stream of M&A research has considered
the role of CEOs’ personality, making it important to compare and contrast
extraversion to related personality constructs that have received attention.
Roll’s (1986) unease with rational explanations for M&As led him to intro-
duce the hubris hypothesis, whereby he argued that the exaggerated self-
confidence among some CEOs explains why they attempt to build empires and
why they overestimate their capacity to generate returns from M&As. Hubristic
or overconfident CEOs have been found to make more M&As, pay higher pre-
miums, and destroy more value than other CEOs (e.g., Hayward and Hambrick,
1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Extraverts’ positive affect is in part
reflected by their self-confidence (e.g., Diener and Fujita, 1995) or self-esteem
(e.g., Cheng and Furnham, 2003); they are often viewed as strong, confident
individuals (Watson and Clark, 1997). Extraversion has also been linked to
overconfidence—greater confidence unmatched by greater accuracy in cogni-
tive tasks (Schaefer et al., 2004). For complex tasks, however, extraverts’
greater confidence may be matched by related agentic qualities, such as their
ambition and energy and their ability to bring others into the fold. Scholars have
argued that extraverts are more likely to be transformational leaders not just
because they are more confident but also because they generate confidence
among others (Bono and Judge, 2004).
Scholars have also emphasized CEOs’ narcissism—excessive interest in, or
admiration of, oneself (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007)—involving an
intense need to confirm one’s own superiority and to be in the spotlight, which
results in favoring visible and bold actions to attract attention and receive
applause (e.g., Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). M&As, especially large ones,
appeal to narcissistic CEOs (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Zhu
and Chen, 2015). Extraversion and narcissism share some features such as
boldness, self-confidence, and a desire for social attention (Wilt and Revelle,
2009), and narcissists have been labeled ‘‘disagreeable extraverts’’ as they
have high extraversion and low agreeableness scores (Paulhus and Williams,
2002). When it comes to leadership, extraversion may be a more constructive
trait than narcissism: a recent meta-analysis revealed that extraversion explains
the positive effect of narcissism on leadership emergence (Grijalva et al.,
2015), and while extraversion relates to leadership effectiveness (Judge et al.,
2002), narcissism does not (Grijalva et al., 2015).
Using regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998), Gamache et al. (2015) argued
that CEOs with a promotion focus (preferring gains and growth), rather than a
prevention focus (preferring stability and security), are more likely to conduct
M&As because they have higher aspirations for their firms and view more
opportunities for growth. The positive affect, reward sensitivity, and approach
behavior of extraverts (Watson and Clark, 1997; John and Srivastava, 1999;
Lucas et al., 2000) are clearly associated with this promotion focus, and a
recent meta-analysis affirmed that extraverts are more likely to have this focus
(Gorman et al., 2012).
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CEOs’ Extraversion and Firms’ M&A Behavior
We argue that more-extraverted CEOs participate in more M&A activity than
other CEOs due to their tendency to seek and enjoy large-scale growth oppor-
tunities, spot acquisitive growth opportunities and view these opportunities
more positively, and transform these opportunities into collective action.
Considering that CEOs likely attain their positions not just by getting along with
others but also by having a drive to get ahead together with others (cf. Do and
Minbashian, 2014), this effect likely is influenced more by agentic rather than
affiliative aspects of extraversion.
Extraverted CEOs are more likely to seek and enjoy large-scale growth due
to their distinctive motivational tendencies. M&As generally prompt the involve-
ment of many parties, including boards, consultants, lawyers, regulators, and
target firm members, and they attract considerable media attention (e.g., Liu
and McConnell, 2013). Though less extraverted CEOs may view such stake-
holder interaction as necessary but challenging, more-extraverted CEOs enjoy
and may actively seek such interaction (e.g., Ashton, Lee, and Paunonen, 2002;
Wilt and Revelle, 2016). Moreover, extraverted CEOs are more likely to seek
ambitious growth plans like M&As because they have more of a promotion
than prevention focus (Gorman et al., 2012).
Extraverted CEOs are also likely to have greater access to information about
M&A opportunities. A recent meta-analysis by Fang et al. (2015) indicated that
while more-extraverted people may not take a more-central place than others
in expressive networks of friendships, they do so in instrumental networks that
have a job- or firm-related purpose. Fang et al. (2015) also showed that extra-
verts seek brokerage roles in such instrumental networks and emphasized
agentic features—assertiveness and ambition—to explain this effect. Such
instrumental networks are a critical source of task-related knowledge, exper-
tise, and information (e.g., Forret and Dougherty, 2001), and for CEOs they pro-
vide a rich source of growth opportunities. Extraverted CEOs likely will interact
more in instrumental networks, and as a result they more often engage with
other CEOs, board members, and consultants at work and social events where
critical M&A-related information is shared, thus increasing the likelihood that
extraverted CEOs spot M&A opportunities and attractive targets before their
less extraverted counterparts.
Because of their positive affect and promotion focus, extraverted CEOs also
are more likely than other CEOs to perceive growth opportunities more posi-
tively and to consider more positive information on potential targets. Moreover,
because of their higher level of engagement with the environment and their
approach temperament (Watson and Clark, 1997; John and Srivastava, 1999),
extraverted CEOs likely are more enthusiastic about growth opportunities
(Gorman et al., 2012). In contrast, less extraverted CEOs may perceive and
emphasize more hurdles and caveats, and they may consider more negative
and neutral information in combination with positive information.
Finally, extraverted CEOs likely act on M&A opportunities more successfully
than other CEOs and generate the necessary collective action for completing
these deals. Extraverts excel when placed in complex environments, as they
are more assertive and decisive (Wilt and Revelle, 2016) and are more likely to
influence and persuade others to join the effort (cf. Morrone-Strupinsky and
Depue, 2004). In the context of M&As, extraverted CEOs will be better at
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sifting through contradictory information and divergent stakes, and with their
optimistic perspective and transformational leadership style (Bono and Judge,
2004; Do and Minbashian, 2014), they are more likely to bring others into the
fold by instilling confidence and enthusiasm.
These effects on seeking, spotting, positively valuing, and acting on M&A
opportunities likely also influence the size of deals done by extraverted CEOs.
Larger deals are more complex and more likely affect the firm as a whole, and
they exert greater influence on more diverse stakeholders (e.g., Chatterjee,
2009; Ellis et al., 2011). As such, compared with smaller deals, larger deals
require more social engagement and more persuasion and enthusiasm to rally
the troops. Thus we expect extraverted CEOs to make not only more M&As
but also larger M&As.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): CEO extraversion is positively related to a firm’s M&A
likelihood.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): CEO extraversion is positively related to a firm’s M&A deal
size.
The Mediating Effect of a CEO’s Board Network
The effect of CEOs’ extraversion on M&A behavior may be explained, in part,
by their board networks because of the importance of board networks in identi-
fying M&A opportunities and the higher likelihood of extraverted CEOs being
on other firms’ boards. For CEOs, board networks often are the most influential
sets of connections among their instrumental networks. Board activities pro-
vide CEOs with rich information on industry trends, market conditions, latest
business practices, and private insights into other firms. Such insights directly
affect CEOs’ decision making and, as a result, the behavior and performance of
their firms (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Westphal, 1999; Larcker, So, and
Wang, 2013).
There are many ways in which M&A opportunities surface in board-related
meetings or social events (cf. Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). Connected
board members may know of attractive targets, serve on boards of targets,
and discuss acquirers that are seeking targets (Haunschild, 1993). Board net-
works provide valuable, private information on potential target firms, which
helps reduce information asymmetry and expedite M&A decisions (Cai and
Sevilir, 2012; El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2015). They also are a source of
how-to knowledge for doing M&As, enabling CEOs to learn from network part-
ners about which investment bankers to use, how to structure deals, how to
deal with competing bids, etc. (Haunschild, 1993).
Board positions require commitment and regular interactions with other
members. Considering that extraverts tend to take a more-central place in
instrumental networks than their peers and are more likely to connect with oth-
ers in these networks (Fang et al., 2015), extraverted CEOs should be more
likely to be asked to serve and stay on boards. Given their desire for social
engagement (Costa and McCrae, 1985; Wilt and Revelle, 2016), extraverted
CEOs should also be more likely to actively pursue and accept these invitations
than their less extraverted counterparts.
Extraverted CEOs likely seek board memberships not merely for the sake of
socializing but because their ambition, energy, and assertiveness lead them to
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actively build these influential networks with an eye for growth opportunities
(cf. Do and Minbashian, 2014; Fang et al., 2015). Thus extraverted CEOs are
more likely to seek central positions in board networks, which may give them
better insights into M&A opportunities. Indeed, highly connected CEOs seem
to make more M&As (El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2015). As such, we propose
that:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): CEOs’ board network size partially mediates the positive rela-
tionship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A likelihood.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): CEOs’ board network size partially mediates the positive rela-
tionship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A deal size.
The Moderating Influence of Situational Strength
The strong-situation hypothesis suggests that variance in situational strength
influences the extent to which personality affects behavior (for reviews, see
Cooper and Withey, 2009; Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida, 2010). In strong situa-
tions, prescribed rules dictate appropriate behavior, allowing little margin for
personality to influence behavior. In weak situations, people enjoy more discre-
tion to behave in ways guided by their personality. Mischel (1977b) suggested
that situations are likely to be stronger when people have similar interpretations
of the situation, have uniform expectations about the most appropriate
response in the situation, see acceptable incentives for that response, and per-
ceive that they have the skills necessary to construct and execute the
response. When it comes to the influence of CEOs’ extraversion on M&A
behavior, we expect industry competitiveness and managerial entrenchment to
be powerful indicators of situational strength.
Industry competitiveness. Industry competitiveness refers to the number
of firms competing for the same product market (Porter, 1980; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996). In terms of situational strength, it indicates whether
CEOs and others have clear and consistent information that pursuing M&As is
an adequate response to competitive dynamics.
In highly competitive industries, speed to market is crucial (Brown and
Eisenhardt, 1998), and firms—as well as industry experts, consultants, and
investors—perceive a constant pressure to grow profits and fend off competi-
tive actions (Eisenhardt, 1989; D’Aveni, 1994). CEOs have strong incentives to
seek new growth opportunities and to act fast to stay competitive (Aghion
et al., 2001). M&As are widely considered to be a critical strategic tool and to
be important for success and survival in such industries, as alternatives tend to
be too slow. Most CEOs, regardless of personality, see logic in pursuing M&As
to stay agile in these markets, and persuading others is easy because they also
more readily see M&As as a salient option. Thus in the most competitive indus-
tries, M&As are the norm.
In contrast, there are no strong predefined norms about pursuing M&As in
less competitive industries. Firms can take more time to grow, and they face
fewer direct competitive threats and experience less volatility. This situation
provides more scope for options regarding growth and speed (D’Aveni, 1994),
so CEOs in less competitive industries enjoy more discretion to either pursue a
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steady course or push for rapid growth. Less fiercely competitive industries are
akin to weak situations, in which there is less clear or consistent information
about whether M&As are an adequate response, allowing more room for pre-
ferences fueled by personality (cf. Mischel, 1977b; Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida,
2010). Less extraverted CEOs are more likely than extraverted CEOs to feel
comfortable keeping a steady course. With less need for speedy or bold
moves, the predisposition of less extraverted CEOs to emphasize more neutral
and negative information (e.g., Watson and Clark, 1997) constrains the pursuit
of M&As. Even when perceiving M&A opportunities, less extraverted CEOs
might find it harder to convince diverse stakeholders who do not readily accept
the need for acquisitive growth in less competitive industries.
In such industries, the acquisitive nature of extraverted CEOs likely reveals
itself more distinctly because of their persistent ambition and their desires for
social engagement and attention (e.g., Wilt and Revelle, 2016). Particularly
when the situation does not readily call for acquisitive growth, the persuasive
nature of extraverted CEOs can make a difference. Thus when an industry is
less fiercely competitive, we expect a clearer distinction in the influence of
CEOs’ extraversion on M&A behavior.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Industry competitiveness moderates the relationship between
CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A behavior, such that in less competitive indus-
tries, the relationship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A likelihood will
be stronger.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Industry competitiveness moderates the relationship between
CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A behavior, such that in less competitive indus-
tries, the relationship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A deal size will
be stronger.
Managerial entrenchment. Corporate governance is intended to put con-
trolling and monitoring provisions in place to assure the suitable alignment of a
CEO’s behavior with the interests of a firm’s owners and other stakeholders
(e.g., Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003; Finkelstein,
Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Managerial entrenchment reflects a lack of
such provisions. Agency theorists have long argued that managers of public
corporations may make self-interested decisions that may destroy corporate
wealth (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and research has focused on when
conflicts of interest between managers and owners likely arise and which tools
can be used to reduce them (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton et al.,
2007; Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Corporate governance provisions not only
constrain self-interest but also curb CEOs to act more generally according to
stakeholders’ terms (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).
Managerial entrenchment reflects the extent to which CEOs have the free-
dom to behave in accordance with their own personalities and thus reflects a
form of situational strength. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) found that
managerial entrenchment depends on whether board elections are staggered
(i.e., only a fraction of the board is elected at one time), shareholder amend-
ments of the bylaws are limited, and supermajority requirements are in place
for both M&As and charter amendments. Each of these indicators gives CEOs
increased protection from removal or the consequences of removal from the
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firm (Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). Managerial entrenchment weakens
the disciplinary power of the shareholders and the board, and it allows CEOs
greater discretion and autonomy to act on their own (Hambrick and Finkelstein,
1987; Hambrick, 2007).
In contrast, weaker entrenchment reflects stronger situations in which there
are more clearly defined formal and informal rules or processes that must be
followed, as well as stronger incentives for CEOs to abide by them (cf.
Mischel, 1977b; Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida, 2010). Under more scrutiny from
monitoring bodies, and checks and balances, CEOs have fewer opportunities
to exhibit behaviors akin to their personalities. This is particularly relevant in the
context of M&A decisions, as these tend to attract attention from many internal
and external stakeholders.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Managerial entrenchment moderates the relationship between
CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A behavior, such that in firms with higher man-
agerial entrenchment, the relationship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’
M&A likelihood will be stronger.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b):Managerial entrenchment moderates the relationship between
CEOs’ extraversion and firms’ M&A behavior, such that in firms with higher man-
agerial entrenchment, the relationship between CEOs’ extraversion and firms’
M&A deal size will be stronger.
The Relationship between CEOs’ Extraversion and Shareholders’
Reactions to M&As
Though our main focus is on understanding whether, why, and when CEOs’
extraversion influences M&A behavior, we also consider whether it influences
shareholders’ reactions to M&As. There is strong evidence that M&As gener-
ally destroy value for acquiring firms (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz,
2005), but at least some of the qualities of extraverted CEOs may also translate
into more positive reactions from shareholders.
M&A decisions are complex, both cognitively and socially. They involve
uncertain, ambiguous, and often conflicting information, as well as heightened
scrutiny from diverse stakeholders. Such a dynamic social environment is the
natural habitat for extraverts; they tend to perform well under high time pres-
sure and when multiple stimuli compete for attention (e.g., Matthews, Deary,
and Whiteman, 2003; Roskes et al., 2013; Wilt and Revelle, 2016). Moreover,
extraverted CEOs are more comfortable than other CEOs when engaging with
many stakeholders and are more persuasive in presenting the case for under-
taking an M&A.
The strong link between extraversion—particularly its agentic aspects—and
transformational leadership (e.g., Bono and Judge, 2004; Do and Minbashian,
2014) is particularly relevant to M&A success because, by their very nature,
M&As involve considerable change. Under these conditions, extraverted CEOs’
ability to instill confidence and generate commitment among members of both
the acquiring firm and the target is crucial. Extraverted CEOs are more likely
than other CEOs to convey a clear vision, guide the change, inspire others, and
execute the M&A together with committed organization members.
Whether shareholders will react more positively to M&As by extraverted
CEOs, however, is not assured. Less extraverted CEOs also have qualities that
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shareholders may value, such as tending to excel in tasks that require enduring,
focused attention (Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman, 2003). Also, the leadership
effectiveness of extraverts may be conditional—working well for obedient subor-
dinates but evoking resistance among assertive subordinates (e.g., Grant, Gino,
and Hoffman, 2011). Moreover, scholars have linked extreme extraversion to risk
taking and the self-serving pursuit of adventure (Judge et al., 2002); M&As driven
by such CEO behavior will evoke more negative reactions. As the link between
CEOs’ extraversion and shareholders’ reactions is unclear, we consider it an
important empirical question, which we address in the Results section.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
To compile our sample, we used ExecuComp, which covers firms that are, or
have been, listed on the S&P 1500 Index. To assess extraversion (discussed
below), we obtained transcripts from Thomson Street Events of all recorded
conference calls that covered quarterly earnings announcements in which
CEOs participated between 2002 and 2012, a total of 87,632 calls. After remov-
ing observations with missing data, the final sample included personality scores
for 2,381 CEOs. We matched these CEO data with SDC Platinum data on
M&As completed between 2002 and 2013. To ensure that the deals required
CEOs’ attention, we included deals worth at least 5 percent of the acquirer’s
value (cf. Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Yim, 2013), amounting to 1,710
deals that matched CEO-firm observations.2
Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), we analyzed firm-year observations of
each focal firm by first aggregating M&A data by each calendar year and then mer-
ging firm-year observations with CEO-firm data. We excluded those firm-years in
which there was a change of CEO to ensure that the CEO led the firm for the full
calendar year. We supplemented these data with firm, industry, and board informa-
tion from Compustat and BoardEx. After merging all variables and removing miss-
ing values, we had a final dataset of 10,166 CEO-firm-year observations.
The fields of psychology and computational linguistics have identified numer-
ous personality markers in language (e.g., Argamon et al., 2005; Mairesse
et al., 2007; Gow et al., 2016). A popular tool to analyze text is the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) created by Pennebaker and colleagues
(Pennebaker and King, 1999; Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth, 2001), which
matches words in text using a dictionary of 80 psychologically relevant cate-
gories, such as positive or negative emotions, self-reflection, and causal think-
ing. Unfortunately, the LIWC does not provide direct measures of the Big Five
personality dimensions.
Measuring Extraversion
In the past decade, much progress has been made in gauging personality from
text. Notably, Mairesse et al. (2007) used computer programming to derive Big
Five personality scores from conversations and texts. They started with two
training datasets from Pennebaker and King (1999) and Mehl, Gosling, and
Pennebaker (2006) that consisted of spoken texts and essays from people for
2 Our results remain the same if we use all completed mergers and acquisitions.
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whom Big Five scores were available from self-reports and independent
observers. Based on previous research that linked measurable linguistic fea-
tures to personality traits, they extracted relevant features from these texts,
including frequency counts of 88 word categories from the LIWC and 14 addi-
tional features from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981).3 For
extraversion, important linguistic features include word count, word repetition,
concreteness, imageability, and references to family and friends.
To model personality traits, Mairesse et al. (2007) used the LIWC and MRC
features as data input for machine learning, through which algorithms are
developed (or learned) from input data. Through machine learning the algorithm
is improved by adapting weights assigned to linguistic features in the text so
that there is a better match with the personality scores from self-reports and
independent observers. Mairesse et al. (2007) tested the predictive power of
the models using texts from individuals who were not included in the training
samples, and their ‘‘support vector machine model’’ performed best across all
Big Five dimensions.4 We therefore used this algorithm to predict CEO person-
ality.5 Table 1 presents the ten most important linguistic features and their
respective weights to measure extraversion. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix
Table 1. Ten Most Important Linguistic Features in Measuring Extraversion
Linguistic
feature Source Description
Relation with
extraversion Weights
Unique LIWC Measure of repetition of words in a given text. – .6457
MEANP MRC Paivio meaningfulness, defined as the mean value of written
associations people list with a word in 30 seconds. (Paivio, 1968)
+ .3553
We LIWC The relative number of times the first-person plural is used, e.g.,
‘‘we,’’ ‘‘us,’’ ‘‘our’’ (11 words).
+ .2845
T-L-FREQ MRC Measure of how frequently words are used in the English language.
(Thorndike and Lorge, 1944)
– .2544
Number LIWC The relative frequency of numbers in the text, e.g., ‘‘one,’’ ‘‘thirty,’’
‘‘million’’ (29 words).
– .2468
Motion LIWC The relative frequency of words related to motion in the text, e.g.,
‘‘walk,’’ ‘‘move,’’ ‘‘go’’ (73 words).
+ .2464
Insight LIWC The relative frequency of words related to insight, e.g., ‘‘think,’’
‘‘know,’’ ‘‘consider’’ (116 words).
– .2355
Up LIWC The relative frequency of words like ‘‘up,’’ ‘‘above,’’ ‘‘over’’ (12
words).
– .2296
NLET MRC Average number of letters in a word. – .2282
WPS LIWC Average number of words per sentence. + .2219
3 The MRC contains a machine-usable dictionary of over 150,000 words providing information on
26 different linguistic properties, such as estimates of the age at which a word is typically learned,
the commonality of a word, and the general exposure to a word.
4 A support vector machine training algorithm is a non-probabilistic binary linear classifier—it builds
a model that assigns features to one category (e.g., less extravert) or another (more extravert). The
features can be viewed as points in space, mapped so that the features of the separate categories
are divided by a clear gap that is as wide as possible, and subsequent features are then mapped
into that same space and predicted to belong to a category based on which side of the gap they fall
on (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). Mairesse et al. (2007) applied regression models to produce continu-
ous scores rather than just classification.
5 Mairesse et al. (2007) made the algorithm available through a Java command-line application,
‘‘The Personality Recognizer,’’ that reads text files and computes estimates of personality scores
along the Big Five.
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(http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0001839217712240) provides
an illustrative analysis on text produced during Apple’s Q4 conference call in
2010 by Steve Jobs and Tim Cook, who have been compared to Star Trek’s
extraverted Captain Kirk and less extraverted Dr. Spock, respectively.6
Quarterly earnings conference calls with financial analysts generally have a
presentation segment and a Q&A segment. The presentation segment is not
suitable for assessing CEO personality because the text used in the presenta-
tion is likely to be scripted by others. In contrast, text spoken by a CEO in
response to questions is more likely to be the CEO’s own words and
unscripted (Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen, 2011). Text spoken during the
Q&A segment is particularly appropriate for assessing CEOs’ extraversion
because people tend to reveal variations in extraversion more readily under
complex and stressful conditions (Dewaele and Furnham, 1999). Conference
calls can be quite difficult for CEOs because questions from analysts often are
direct and not easily anticipated, and answers can be consequential—capital
markets respond instantly to information provided in these calls (Frankel,
Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). Because they are held quarterly over multiple
years, these calls capture various contextual settings over time, allowing us to
assess long-term stable traits of CEOs (Li, 2010).7 Because longer texts yield
more-reliable personality scores, we aggregated all texts spoken by the CEOs
in the Q&A segment from calls between 2002 and 2012. We included only
those CEOs for whom we had at least 500 spoken words; the average word
count was 23,088 words, with a range of 506 to 113,956 words.
Validating the Extraversion Measure
Mairesse et al. (2007) conducted a series of validity checks, and to assure the
instrument is also valid for a sample of CEOs, we conducted several additional
checks. A first indication of clear convergent validity is reflected in the strong
association between the raw number of words spoken and extraversion (r =
.50; p < .0001), which scholars have identified as one of the strongest linguis-
tic correlates with extraversion (Mehl, Gosling, and Pennebaker, 2006). Also,
the measure relates to other variables that have been associated with extraver-
sion in previous personality research, which we discuss in the Results section.
We also performed validity checks using security analysts (cf. Chatterjee
and Hambrick, 2007) and two trained psychologists—a recruiter and an
academic—who were asked to rate the extraversion of CEOs who varied
according to the algorithm. The analysts assessed well-known CEOs in the
industries they followed, and the psychologists assessed CEOs based on back-
ground articles and videos. The respondents completed five extraversion items
from the Big Five personality inventory: (1) ‘‘this CEO is outgoing, sociable,’’
(2) ‘‘this CEO is full of energy,’’ (3) ‘‘this CEO has an assertive personality,’’
(4) ‘‘this CEO is reserved’’ (reverse scored), and (5) ‘‘this CEO generates a lot
of enthusiasm,’’ which we averaged to obtain extraversion scores on a four-
point scale (1 = not at all extravert, 2 = slightly extravert, 3 = moderately
6 www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/the-real-reason-apples-tim-cook-has-been-underestimated.
7 To check the time consistency of the personality scores, in separate analyses, we split the dataset
into two periods, 2002–2007 and 2008–2012, and derived the extraversion scores for each CEO in
the two periods. Both scores were highly correlated (r = .5; p < .01), indicating the scores reflect a
more enduring trait of the CEOs.
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extravert, 4 = highly extravert). From 19 analysts, we obtained 47 usable rat-
ings on 12 CEOs, and from the two psychologists, we obtained 34 usable rat-
ings on 17 CEOs.8 The single-item intraclass correlation was .85 (p < .01) and
.60 (p < .01) for the analysts and the psychologists, respectively, indicating
satisfactory agreement among respondents. Spearman’s rank correlation coef-
ficient between the average rating for each CEO and the algorithm score was
.81 (p < .01) and .65 (p < .01) for the analysts and psychologists, respec-
tively, providing strong evidence of construct validity.
Mairesse et al. (2007) assessed the binary classification accuracy of their
algorithms by considering how accurately algorithms classified people high or
low on personality traits in the same way as observers’ and self-reported mea-
sures did. They found that extraversion is the easiest trait to model, with binary
classification accuracies as high as 73 percent. We extended these binary clas-
sification checks to consider how accurately the algorithm captured extraver-
sion for a population of CEOs. We selected excerpts of about 300 words
spoken by CEOs who varied in extraversion scores based on the algorithm. We
then asked respondents to classify pairs of CEOs in terms of most and least
extravert, and we determined the binary classification accuracy between the
algorithm scores and the raters’ scores. We first placed this exercise on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, which yielded 56 participants providing 519 valid
responses, resulting in 68 percent accuracy with the prediction based on the
algorithm and a 73 percent interrater agreement.9 We then approached ana-
lysts and investors, who are more familiar with such texts from conference
calls. We received responses from 21 analysts and investors who responded
to an e-mail invitation, providing 168 valid responses that yielded 74 percent
accuracy with the prediction based on the algorithm, with an 84 percent interra-
ter agreement. We also collected videos and background articles featuring 40
CEOs who varied in extraversion scores based on the algorithm, and we asked
master’s students who had recently taken a psychology course to classify pairs
of CEOs in terms of who was most and least extravert. This yielded 64 percent
accuracy with the prediction based on the algorithm, with a 76 percent interra-
ter agreement. These checks provide strong support that the algorithm also
works well for a population of CEOs.
Dependent Variables
We used two proxies to measure a firm’s likelihood to acquire: M&A propen-
sity and M&A frequency. In line with previous research (e.g., Malmendier and
Tate, 2008; Yim, 2013), we measured M&A propensity as a binary variable that
equals 1 if the firm completed at least one deal in a particular year and 0 other-
wise. Also in line with previous research (e.g., Levi, Li, and Zhang, 2014;
Gamache et al., 2015), we measured M&A frequency as the total number of
M&As made by each firm in a given year.
To measureM&A size, we first summed the transaction values of all com-
pleted M&As made by firm i in year t, and we then standardized the value by
8 We considered only those CEOs for whom we were able to obtain at least two scores. We
removed responses when analysts indicated they were not familiar with the CEO and when psy-
chologists indicated the material they examined was insufficient to assess extraversion.
9 We considered all participants who correctly answered a few simple questions about the meaning
of extraversion and took at least five minutes with the survey.
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dividing it by firm i ’s total assets in year t. We also divided this measure by the
number of M&As in the year to estimate the average transaction value of the
deals. This gave us a continuous measure of M&A size.
Mediator and Moderators
To measure CEO’s board network size, we collected information on CEOs’ out-
side board memberships from BoardEx. In each fiscal year, we counted the
number of boards on which a CEO served, excluding the focal firm’s board.
We used this count to run the mediation analysis.
We determined industry competitiveness by calculating the reversed
Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which is based on the market share of all firms in
each industry defined by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes:
Industry competitiveness= 
XN
i = 1
S2i
where Si is the market share of firm i in the four-digit SIC industry, and N is the
number of firms in the same industry. We calculated market share based on
sales data from Computstat. We reversed the measure so that a higher num-
ber reflects higher industry competitiveness.
To measure managerial entrenchment, we used the E-index developed by
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), which measures the number of anti-
takeover provisions in a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state in which
a firm is incorporated. The index is developed based on six provisions: (1) stag-
gered board, (2) limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, (3) super-
majority requirements for charter amendments, (4) supermajority requirements
for mergers, (5) golden parachutes, and (6) poison pills. Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009) counted the number of these provisions that the company had in
a given year and assigned each firm a score from zero to six. A higher E-index
score suggests that it is more difficult to remove management by takeovers,
signaling weaker corporate governance and stronger managerial entrenchment.
Control Variables
CEO, firm, industry, and year controls. We controlled for various other
personality traits that have been emphasized in previous research. Malmendier
and Tate (2008) found overconfident CEOs to be more acquisitive, and we fol-
lowed their approach to measure CEO overconfidence by using CEO stock
option exercise data from the ExecuComp database. If a CEO has stock
options that are deep in the money—it is highly profitable to exercise the
options at the current stock price—but the CEO chooses to hold them, this
suggests that the CEO is very optimistic about the company’s future and sig-
nals CEO overconfidence. Risk-taking CEOs may also be more acquisitive, and
in accordance with Cain and McKeon (2016), we measured CEO risk-taking pre-
ference by identifying CEOs who hold aircraft pilot licenses. We collected pilot-
CEO information from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airmen
Certification database and used a dummy variable of 1 for a CEO with a pilot
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license and 0 otherwise.10 We followed Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) in
proxying CEO narcissism using relative cash pay—the CEO’s cash compensa-
tion divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm—and non-
cash pay—the CEO’s non-cash compensation divided by that of the second-
highest-paid executive in the firm.11 We also controlled for CEO regulatory
focus using word lists developed by Gamache et al. (2015). Finally, as extraver-
sion tends to correlate with the other Big Five traits (e.g., Olson, 2005), we also
controlled for the other four traits (emotional stability, agreeableness, conscien-
tious, and openness) to reduce the likelihood of a spurious association.
We controlled for CEO age, because younger CEOs acquire more (Yim,
2013), CEO tenure (number of years the CEO has worked as a CEO in the focal
firm), CEO ownership (percentage of issued stocks owned by the CEO), and
CEO gender (a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO is male). We obtained
two proxies to capture CEO power as it affects CEOs’ influence over organiza-
tional behavior (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005): CEO-chairman duality
(a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board and 0
otherwise) and founder CEOs (a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is
also the founder of the company and 0 otherwise). Including these CEO con-
trols in our models should ensure that our results are not confounded by other
CEO characteristics that may also influence firms’ M&A behavior.
We controlled for a number of firm-level variables: firm size, measured as
the logarithm of total assets of the firm; Tobin’s Q to control for a firm’s invest-
ment opportunities; return on assets to control for firm performance; free cash
flow to asset ratio to control for a firm’s internal resources; long-term debt to
asset ratio to further control for a firm’s risk-taking behavior (Cronqvist,
Makhija, and Yonker, 2012); the number of M&As made by the firm in the past
three years to account for previous M&A experience; and firm age, measured
from the year the firm was founded—if the founding year was missing, we
used the first year the company appeared in the Compustat database as the
base year. We also controlled for board characteristics: board size, percentage
of independent board members on the board, and the percentage of female
directors on the board (Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2016). Finally, we con-
trolled for industry-level heterogeneity and seasonal variations by including both
industry (SIC 4) and year dummy variables.
Correction for endogeneity in CEO selection. It is possible that firms
wishing to pursue high growth are more likely to recruit or attract extraverted
CEOs, which could lead to a self-selection bias. We followed Chatterjee and
Hambrick’s (2007) two-step method to address this concern. First, we estimated
a model to test the determinants of CEO extraversion, as shown in table 2.
Based on these determinants, we estimated a pooled sample regression model
with CEO extraversion as the dependent variable. Following Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007), we used the significant determinants to estimate a predicted
value of CEO extraversion; see table 2. We then controlled for this predicted
10 Available at https://amsrvs.registry.faa.gov/airmeninquiry/.
11 To avoid losing too many observations, we included only these two indicators of narcissism in
the full sample. As a robustness check, we also included the other three hand-collected narcissism
indicators in a subsample analysis. Details about the analysis are discussed in the robustness tests
section.
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Table 2. Determinants of CEO Extraversion*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Emotional stability .360••• .339••• .348•••
(.034) (.037) (.038)
Agreeable –.801••• –.824••• –.835•••
(.048) (.052) (.052)
Conscientious .597••• .601••• .593•••
(.035) (.039) (.039)
Openness –.019 –.035 –.019
(.035) (.039) (.039)
CEO age –.010••• –.010•••
(.002) (.002)
CEO tenure .000 .000
(.002) (.003)
CEO ownership –.000••• –.000•••
(.000) (.000)
CEO duality –.059•• –.056••
(.028) (.028)
CEO founder –.032 –.034
(.045) (.046)
CEO gender .205•• .157
(.091) (.098)
CEO relative cash pay .025••• .026•••
(.008) (.008)
CEO relative non-cash pay .007•• .006•
(.003) (.003)
CEO pilot license .086 .087
(.095) (.096)
CEO overconfidence .006 .000
(.036) (.036)
Ivy League graduates –.048 –.044
(.037) (.036)
American CEOs .059• .061•
(.033) (.034)
Firm size .008
(.011)
Firm performance (ROA) .294•
(.155)
Firm debt –.003
(.010)
Firm age –.000
(.000)
Percentage of female directors –.322••
(.157)
Total M&As in the past three years .024•••
(.008)
Board size –.000
(.001)
Percentage of independent directors .165••
(.079)
Constant 4.391••• 4.935••• 4.690•••
(.262) (.329) (.347)
CEO-firm-year observations 13,695 11,000 10,711
Number of firms 1,858 1,655 1,639
R2 .286 .309 .318
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all models.
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value of CEO extraversion in our main regression models to predict firms’ M&A
behavior. This approach helped to control for the self-selection of extraverted
CEOs and reduced the possibility of an endogenous bias.
Correction for sample selection bias. We included only firms for which a
CEO personality score was available and therefore had to exclude a number of
firms. We followed Heckman’s (1979) two-step method to correct for any
potential sample selection bias this could have caused. First, we downloaded
data from Compustat on all publicly listed U.S. firms between 2002 and 2013.
We compared the firm-year observations in our sample with this larger dataset
and created a dummy variable that equaled 1 if the firm-year observation from
our sample was also present in the larger dataset and 0 otherwise. We then
ran a probit model using this binary variable to regress on specific firm charac-
teristics, such as firm size, performance, Tobin’s Q, and firm age, and CEO
characteristics, including CEO age, tenure, and ownership. We subsequently
estimated the probability of each sample observation based on the estimates
from the probit model and included this estimate in our main regression mod-
els; following the literature, we call this variable the inverse Mills ratio.
Models and Estimation
Model estimations varied with respect to the dependent variables. First, for
acquisition propensity, measured as a binary variable, we estimated the follow-
ing logistic regression model:
Pr Yit = 1jEijt,Xit1
 = Logit β1+β2Eijt + β3Xit1
 
where Yit is the binary variable that measures the acquisition propensity of firm
i in year t, Eijt is the extraversion score of CEO j in firm i in year t, and Xit–1 is a
set of control variables for firm i in lagged year t – 1. Note that CEO extraver-
sion is a static measure in the ten-year sample period. As a CEO may work for
more than one firm during this ten-year period, we only regressed M&A pro-
pensity on the extraversion scores of the CEOs in the same M&A year so that
the decision can be solely attributed to the focal CEO. We excluded years in
which there was a CEO change because it was not possible to accurately
determine whether the M&A decision was made by the outgoing or incoming
CEO in those years.
Second, for acquisition frequency, which is a count measure, we estimated
a Poisson regression model as follows:
Fit =Poisson β1+ β2Eijt + β3Xit1
 
where Fit is the number of M&As made by firm i in year t, Eijt is the extraver-
sion score of CEO j in firm i in year t, and Xit–1 is a set of control variables for
firm i in lagged year t – 1.
Third, for acquisition size, measured as a continuous variable, we ran the fol-
lowing ordinary least squares regression model:
Sit =OLS β1+ β2Eijt +β3Xit1
 
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where Sit is the yearly average of relative total acquisition size to the assets
value for firm i in year t, Eijt is the extraversion score of CEO j in firm i in year t,
and Xit–1 is a set of control variables for firm i in lagged year t – 1.
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RESULTS
Table 3 details the descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlations
between CEO extraversion and the three M&A behavior variables are all posi-
tive and significant, providing preliminary support for H1a and H1b. Tables 2
and 3 also show that CEO extraversion relates to other variables that have
been associated with extraversion in previous personality research: it correlates
with conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness, and income, and it cor-
relates negatively with age (Neugarten, 1977; Costa et al., 1986; John and
Srivastava, 1999; Judge et al., 1999; Seibert and Kraimer, 2001; Grav et al.,
2012). Moreover, although gender differences tend to be small for extraversion
scores in general, women usually score higher on affiliative facets and men
score higher on agentic facets (Feingold, 1994; Helgeson and Fritz, 1999;
Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae, 2001; Weisberg, DeYoung, and Hirsh, 2011).
CEO extraversion is higher for men than for women, providing some evidence
that agentic rather than affiliative features are more important for CEOs (cf. Do
and Minbashian, 2014).
Table 4 shows the results for the direct effect of CEO extraversion on the
three dependent variables. The regression coefficients of the control variables
reveal that firms with more internal resources (cash flow) and M&A experience
tend to acquire more. The results also confirm prior research—CEOs with
stronger promotion focus acquire more (Gamache et al., 2015), and firms with
higher female board representation acquire less (Chen, Crossland and Huang,
2016). In support of H1a and H1b, the models show that CEO extraversion is
positively related to a firm’s propensity to make M&As, frequency of M&As,
and size of M&As.
Table 5 presents the mediating role of CEO board network size. Following
Baron and Kenny (1986) and De Jong and Elfring (2010), we estimated three
stages of separate regression equations. In the first stage (models 1, 2, and 3),
we regressed firms’ M&A behavior on CEO extraversion and the control vari-
ables, thus confirming the direct effect of CEO extraversion on M&A behavior.
In the second stage, we regressed CEO board network size on CEO extraver-
sion, and the results (model 4) show that CEO extraversion has a significant,
positive relationship with CEO board network size. Next, we regressed M&A
behavior on CEO board network size. Models 5, 6, and 7 show that CEO board
network size has a positive and significant relationship with M&A behavior: pro-
pensity, frequency, and size. Finally, we regressed M&A behavior on CEO
extraversion, CEO board network size, and the control variables, and models 8,
9, and 10 show that the significant and positive relationships between CEO
extraversion and M&A behavior that we found in models 1, 2, and 3 are
reduced for M&A propensity, frequency, and size. We also ran a Sobel test to
determine the significance of the mediated effect in accordance with Preacher
12 Our results remain the same when using the total transaction value divided by total asset value
in each firm-year. In all models, we ran a pooled regression with standard errors clustered by CEO-
firm observations.
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Table 3. Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. M&A propensity .10 .30
2. M&A frequency .11 .36 .92
3. M&A size .75 1.61 .81 .73
4. Extraversion 6.44 .69 .06 .05 .05
5. Emotional stability 3.07 .54 .04 .04 .05 .14
6. Agreeable 3.31 .37 –.02 –.01 –.01 –.16 .24
7. Conscientious 6.31 .66 –.02 –.01 .00 .25 –.16 .43
8. Openness 6.03 .64 –.03 –.01 –.02 .11 –.30 .33 .74
9. CEO outside board network .69 .83 .05 .06 .04 .07 .03 .00 –.01 –.08
10. Industry competition –.23 .16 .00 .01 .01 –.07 .02 .04 –.05 –.08 –.06
11. Managerial entrenchment index 2.56 1.22 .03 .04 .01 .02 –.02 .06 .07 .07 .06 .02
12. Firm size 8.20 1.66 –.03 –.02 –.05 .03 .10 –.04 –.09 –.18 .17 .05 –.02
13. Tobin’s Q 1.67 .67 –.04 –.05 .07 –.02 –.04 .07 .06 .04 –.03 –.07 –.11 –.26
14. Cash flow .93 1.91 .02 .03 .03 –.02 –.03 –.03 –.04 –.03 –.04 .06 –.09 .05 .18
15. Firm performance (ROA) .09 .07 –.04 –.04 .05 .05 –.02 .02 .02 .00 .04 –.10 –.05 –.06 .59 .29
16. Firm debt .66 1.02 –.02 –.02 –.06 –.02 .05 .01 –.05 –.03 .03 –.05 .01 .22 –.19 –.12 –.13
17. Firm age 30.27 17.88 –.03 –.02 –.07 .02 .05 –.04 .00 –.01 .16 –.11 .08 .39 –.25 –.12 –.03
18. CEO age 56.21 6.23 .00 .02 –.03 –.04 –.04 –.07 .00 –.06 .17 –.06 .01 .09 –.14 –.02 –.01
19. CEO tenure 8.54 7.10 .00 .01 –.02 –.01 –.03 –.03 .02 –.03 .02 .03 –.11 –.13 .01 .02 –.03
20. CEO ownership .14 .43 –.02 –.01 –.02 –.07 –.06 .01 .02 .04 –.10 .00 –.16 –.17 .07 .05 –.03
21. CEO duality .72 .45 .00 .00 –.02 –.03 –.03 –.08 –.03 –.08 .09 –.04 .06 .21 –.03 –.01 .05
22. Percentage of female directors .11 .09 –.05 –.05 –.05 –.02 .02 –.08 –.03 –.03 .09 –.02 .07 .26 –.06 –.02 .03
23. Total M&As in last three years .87 1.54 .20 .22 .29 .08 .05 –.01 .03 –.01 .06 –.02 –.01 .05 .08 .01 .06
24. Board size 12.91 9.94 –.03 –.03 .00 –.03 .03 –.02 –.04 –.05 .07 .02 –.01 .31 .09 .05 .04
25. Independent directors .70 .20 .01 .01 –.03 .09 .02 .04 .03 .04 .02 –.04 .10 –.10 –.22 –.05 –.09
26. Founder CEOs .16 .37 .00 .00 .02 –.02 .05 .13 .06 .02 –.12 .02 –.13 –.18 .10 .04 –.01
27. Male CEOs .98 .14 .01 .01 .02 .02 –.01 .06 .02 .00 –.05 .03 .10 .06 .00 –.02 .02
28. CEO pilot license .03 .18 .00 .00 .00 –.03 –.04 .00 .00 –.01 –.02 .06 –.03 –.03 .00 –.05 .00
29. CEO overconfidence .36 .48 .02 .02 .03 .06 .00 .00 .07 .02 .04 .01 .01 .05 .10 .05 .11
30. CEO relative cash pay 1.95 .99 .06 .05 .06 .07 –.01 –.01 –.01 .00 .06 –.04 .06 .00 .01 –.01 .05
31. CEO relative non-cash pay 2.66 2.67 .00 .00 –.01 .09 .00 –.05 –.01 .00 .04 –.05 .04 –.02 .01 –.01 .02
32. CEO promotion focus .01 .00 .02 .01 .02 .03 –.10 –.15 .07 .14 –.02 –.09 .02 –.10 .03 –.03 .04
33. CEO prevention focus .04 .95 .06 .05 .07 .40 .28 .10 .17 –.01 .11 –.07 –.01 .16 –.02 .07 .02
Variable 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
17. Firm age .16
18. CEO age –.01 .14
19. CEO tenure –.06 –.15 .46
20. CEO ownership –.05 –.16 .18 .41
21. CEO duality .02 .12 .18 .17 .10
22. Percentage of female directors .08 .27 –.05 –.18 –.10 .10
23. Total M&As in last three years –.05 –.06 .01 .02 –.04 .01 –.04
24. Board size .01 .07 –.03 –.07 –.05 .05 .08 .04
25. Independent directors .06 .14 .08 –.01 –.11 –.07 .14 –.03 –.64
26. Founder CEOs –.08 –.34 –.01 .33 .14 –.02 –.19 .02 –.03 –.08
27. Male CEOs .01 –.01 .09 .06 .02 .06 –.30 .04 .02 –.02 .06
28. CEO pilot license –.01 –.01 .06 .01 .02 .06 –.01 .00 –.02 .02 –.03 .03
29. CEO overconfidence –.05 –.04 .06 .25 .04 .09 .03 .08 .08 –.08 .12 –.03 –.03
30. CEO relative cash pay .03 .04 .02 –.04 –.03 .03 .02 .01 .01 –.01 –.05 .01 .00 .03
31. CEO relative non-cash pay .02 .03 .04 .04 .06 .04 .02 –.02 –.03 .06 –.05 –.01 –.02 .03 .09
32. CEO promotion focus –.06 .02 –.11 –.13 –.15 –.04 .04 .00 –.03 .05 –.06 –.02 –.07 –.03 .02 –.03
33. CEO prevention focus .00 –.01 –.02 –.03 –.09 .00 .01 .11 .03 .04 –.01 .05 –.05 .09 .03 .04 .06
* Correlations > (.03) are significant at p < .05.
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Table 4. Effect of CEO Extraversion on Firms’ M&A Behavior*
Variable M&A propensity M&A frequency M&A size
Extraversion .155•• .174••• .072••
(.063) (.058) (.029)
Firm size –.043 –.042 –.012
(.030) (.027) (.013)
Tobin’s Q –.527••• –.501••• –.021
(.071) (.062) (.036)
Cash flow .050••• .040••• .030•••
(.014) (.013) (.009)
Firm performance (ROA) .095 .124 .089
(.527) (.479) (.276)
Firm debt –.011 –.001 –.015
(.026) (.023) (.011)
Firm age –.009••• –.009••• –.001
(.003) (.003) (.001)
CEO age –.006 –.005 –.003
(.010) (.009) (.004)
CEO tenure –.001 .002 –.006•
(.008) (.008) (.003)
CEO ownership –.002 –.001 –.000•••
(.001) (.001) (.000)
CEO duality .032 .038 .019
(.081) (.073) (.040)
Percentage of female directors –.677 –.737• –.355•
(.458) (.401) (.213)
Total M&As in the past three years .265••• .179••• .268•••
(.024) (.020) (.017)
CEO pilot license .018 –.033 .019
(.188) (.169) (.095)
CEO overconfidence .097 .050 .052
(.088) (.084) (.045)
CEO relative cash pay (narcissism) .044 .036 .024
(.033) (.029) (.016)
CEO relative non-cash pay (narcissism) .007 .013 .004
(.014) (.013) (.007)
CEO promotion .059 .069•• .033•
(.038) (.034) (.018)
CEO prevention .020 .030 .003
(.040) (.035) (.020)
Inverse Mills ratio .604 .003 .553•
(.702) (.729) (.294)
Control for CEO selection –.040 .128 .111
(.387) (.458) (.181)
Constant –.825 –1.371 .206
(2.180) (2.482) (1.009)
CEO-firm-year observations 10,166 10,166 10,166
Number of firms 1568 1568 1568
R2 .079 .0768 .101
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To ease interpretation of the table, we did not list all control variables
here. Additional controls included in the models were emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
openness, CEO founder, CEO gender, board size, percentage of independent directors, and industry and year fixed
effects.
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Table 5. Mediating Effect of CEO’s Board Network*
Variable
(1)
M&A
propensity
(2)
M&A
frequency
(3)
M&A
size
(4)
CEO
network
(5)
M&A
propensity
(6)
M&A
frequency
(7)
M&A
size
(8)
M&A
propensity
(9)
M&A
frequency
(10)
M&A
size
Extraversion .190•• .234••• .093•• .100•• .167• .196•• .025
(.095) (.090) (.042) (.041) (.094) (.085) (.041)
CEO board network .189••• .226••• .056•• .179••• .213••• .055•
(.061) (.057) (.028) (.061) (.056) (.028)
Firm size –.095• –.078• –.005 .084••• –.109•• –.097•• –.008 –.112•• –.100•• –.008
(.049) (.043) (.021) (.023) (.049) (.042) (.020) (.049) (.042) (.020)
Tobin’s Q –.613••• –.496••• –.089 –.016 –.623••• –.511••• –.073 –.616••• –.503••• –.072
(.121) (.105) (.061) (.041) (.122) (.107) (.058) (.122) (.107) (.058)
Cash flow .045 .060•• .010 –.010 .047 .061•• .010 .047 .061•• .010
(.030) (.026) (.017) (.010) (.030) (.026) (.014) (.030) (.026) (.014)
Firm performance
(ROA)
–.825 –1.221 .300 .186 –.773 –1.098 .196 –.839 –1.178 .191
(.999) (.916) (.509) (.292) (1.011) (.945) (.485) (1.009) (.937) (.485)
Firm debt –.035 –.021 –.041•• .017 –.043 –.029 –.036•• –.041 –.028 –.036••
(.047) (.043) (.019) (.019) (.048) (.042) (.017) (.047) (.042) (.017)
Firm age –.000 –.001 –.004• .002 –.001 –.001 –.003 –.001 –.001 –.003
(.005) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.002)
CEO age .031 .027 .009 .020••• .025 .018 .008 .027 .020 .009
(.019) (.018) (.008) (.007) (.019) (.020) (.007) (.020) (.020) (.007)
CEO tenure –.015 –.004 –.012•• .012• –.018 –.009 –.013•• –.017 –.008 –.013••
(.013) (.014) (.006) (.006) (.013) (.012) (.005) (.013) (.012) (.005)
CEO ownership –.003 –.002 –.000 –.002••• –.003 –.002 –.000 –.002 –.002 –.000
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.001)
CEO duality .044 –.010 –.011 .050 .038 –.010 –.027 .040 –.010 –.026
(.128) (.116) (.062) (.054) (.127) (.114) (.060) (.127) (.114) (.060)
Percentage of
female directors
–.736 –.458 –.301 .318 –.990 –.776 –.242 –.867 –.609 –.230
(.735) (.650) (.327) (.252) (.746) (.658) (.311) (.744) (.654) (.310)
Total M&As in the
past three years
.257••• .176••• .260••• .010 .257••• .178••• .261••• .255••• .176••• .261•••
(.031) (.025) (.021) (.018) (.031) (.025) (.020) (.030) (.024) (.020)
CEO pilot license .070 .126 –.005 –.156 .094 .163 –.028 .092 .158 –.027
(.251) (.216) (.134) (.139) (.267) (.236) (.117) (.256) (.222) (.115)
CEO overconfidence .045 –.033 .058 .010 .068 .023 .065 .059 .015 .064
(.124) (.117) (.059) (.059) (.123) (.104) (.057) (.122) (.103) (.057)
CEO relative cash
pay (narcissism)
.136••• .109••• .073••• .018 .142••• .119••• .071••• .136••• .112••• .070•••
(.045) (.036) (.026) (.018) (.045) (.035) (.025) (.045) (.036) (.025)
CEO relative non-cash
pay (narcissism)
–.007 –.006 –.009 .004 –.006 –.004 –.008 –.008 –.007 –.009
(.022) (.019) (.010) (.007) (.021) (.018) (.010) (.022) (.018) (.010)
CEO promotion .030 .073 –.007 .019 .014 .048 –.006 .023 .058 –.004
(.059) (.052) (.028) (.027) (.058) (.050) (.027) (.059) (.050) (.027)
CEO prevention .060 .055 .026 –.012 .071 .061 .024 .058 .046 .022
(.060) (.051) (.029) (.029) (.060) (.050) (.028) (.061) (.051) (.028)
Inverse Mills ratio 2.261 1.076 .739 .182 2.259 .854 .710 2.206 .810 .693
(1.385) (1.445) (.544) (.352) (1.384) (1.519) (.518) (1.388) (1.510) (.520)
Control for CEO
selection
.061 .086 .119 –.066 .134 .181 .166 .113 .165 .165
(.472) (.382) (.275) (.162) (.478) (.388) (.246) (.476) (.383) (.246)
Constant –3.278 –3.519 –.737 –.769 –2.595 –2.294 –.463 –3.300 –3.189 –.566
(3.098) (2.717) (1.531) (1.241) (3.072) (2.816) (1.390) (3.111) (2.790) (1.400)
CEO-firm-year
observations
5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035 5,035
Number of firms 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857 857
R2 .104 .102 .126 .170 .105 .105 .121 .106 .107 .121
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To ease interpretation of the table, we did not list all control variables
here. Additional controls included in the models were emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness,
CEO founder, CEO gender, board size, percentage of independent directors, and industry and year fixed effects.
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and Hayes (2004). Our results confirm the mediating effect of CEO’s board size
in the M&A propensity model (z = 2.615; p < .01), M&A frequency model (z =
5.463; p < .01), and M&A size model (z = 2.523; p < .05). The results suggest
that CEO board network size partially mediates the relationship between CEO
extraversion and M&A likelihood and fully mediates the relationship between
CEO extraversion and M&A size, supporting H2a and H2b.
Table 6 shows the moderating effect of industry competitiveness and man-
agerial entrenchment. In support of H3a and H3b, the interaction between CEO
extraversion and industry competitiveness has a negative and significant effect
on a firm’s M&A propensity, frequency, and size. Thus the effect of CEO extra-
version on M&A behavior is indeed stronger in less competitive industries.
Table 6 also shows support for H4a and H4b. The interactions between CEO
extraversion and the managerial entrenchment index on a firm’s M&A propen-
sity, frequency, and size are positive and significant, so the effect of CEO extra-
version on M&A behavior increases with greater managerial entrenchment.
CEOs’ Extraversion and Shareholders’ Reactions
To analyze the effect of CEO extraversion on shareholders’ reactions following
M&As, we followed previous research on M&A performance (e.g., Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1999; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, and Semadeni, 2006) that relied on short-term
stock market reactions to M&A announcements. We collected the daily stock
price of each acquirer in the sample around the deal announcement period from
the CRSP database, and we collected the corresponding stock market index for
the same period. Similar to Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), we used standard
market-adjusted models to calculate daily abnormal stock returns around the
M&A announcement date for each acquirer. We calculated these returns as:
ARj ,t =Rj ,t  Rm,t
where ARj,t was the daily abnormal return for firm j on day t, Rj,t was firm j ’s
daily stock return on day t, and Rm,t represented the daily return of the local
stock market index on day t. We then added daily abnormal returns to measure
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer j. In line with other studies
(e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009;
Gaur, Malhotra, and Zhu, 2013), we used the five-day period (–2, + 2 days)
around the M&A announcement to calculate the CAR:
CARj =
X+ 2
t =2
ARj ,t
A positive CAR suggests that investors believe that the deal will create share-
holder value, while a negative CAR suggests the deal will destroy shareholder
value. We regressed the CAR value of each deal on CEO extraversion score
and the other control variables, and we also included several other important
deal characteristics that usually affect M&A short-term performance: payment
method (cash vs. stock payment), tender offers, private vs. public target firms,
industry relatedness of the acquiring and target firms, and deal value relative to
the acquirer’s size. As table 7 shows, we found a positive relationship between
CEO extraversion and CAR.
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Table 6. Moderating Effect of Industry Competitiveness and Managerial Entrenchment*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable
M&A
propensity
M&A
frequency
M&A
size
M&A
propensity
M&A
frequency
M&A
size
Industry competition × Extraversion –1.267••• –1.185••• –.417•••
(.408) (.364) (.147)
Entrenchment index × Extraversion .699••• .326••• .244•••
(.167) (.096) (.063)
Industry competition 8.868••• 8.611••• 2.930••• .477 .480* .222
(2.687) (2.440) (.936) (.354) (.247) (.141)
Entrenchment index .189* .167* .065 –4.479••• –2.121••• –1.533•••
(.113) (.096) (.050) (1.115) (.648) (.396)
Extraversion –.145 –.086 –.045 .001 .039 .003
(.121) (.104) (.048) (.083) (.054) (.035)
Firm size –.053 –.056* –.007 –.046 .097••• –.006
(.037) (.033) (.016) (.037) (.025) (.016)
Tobin’s Q –.593••• –.523••• –.043 –.602••• –.093 –.046
(.094) (.081) (.043) (.095) (.063) (.043)
Cash flow .062••• .059••• .018 .062••• .019 .018
(.021) (.018) (.011) (.021) (.015) (.011)
Firm performance (ROA) –.388 –.570 .183 –.232 .748 .230
(.782) (.696) (.351) (.792) (.563) (.352)
Firm debt –.024 –.015 –.031•• –.023 –.074••• –.030••
(.038) (.033) (.012) (.037) (.027) (.012)
Firm age –.003 –.004 –.002 –.004 –.002 –.003
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.002)
CEO age .008 .004 .003 .010 .003 .003
(.013) (.012) (.005) (.013) (.008) (.005)
CEO tenure –.005 .001 –.006• –.007 –.009 –.007•
(.010) (.010) (.004) (.010) (.007) (.004)
CEO ownership –.004 –.003 –.001 –.004 –.002 –.001
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001)
CEO duality .053 .043 .030 .042 .040 .024
(.099) (.090) (.045) (.099) (.063) (.045)
Percentage of female directors –1.201•• –.986• –.405 –1.079• –.539 –.366
(.591) (.520) (.251) (.589) (.372) (.250)
Total M&As in the past three years .238••• .166••• .245••• .236••• .182••• .245•••
(.028) (.021) (.018) (.028) (.019) (.018)
CEO pilot license .053 .021 –.005 .017 –.070 –.018
(.250) (.220) (.104) (.245) (.137) (.101)
CEO overconfidence .066 .017 .043 .082 –.024 .051
(.105) (.097) (.049) (.105) (.067) (.049)
CEO relative cash pay (narcissism) .096••• .079•• .045•• .100••• .046•• .046••
(.037) (.032) (.019) (.037) (.021) (.019)
CEO relative non-cash pay (narcissism) –.013 –.003 –.008 –.007 –.000 –.006
(.017) (.015) (.007) (.017) (.011) (.007)
CEO promotion .059 .083•• .029 .064 .037 .029
(.046) (.041) (.021) (.045) (.031) (.021)
CEO prevention .011 .028 –.006 .011 .036 –.003
(.046) (.039) (.021) (.046) (.031) (.021)
Inverse Mills ratio 1.176 .170 .513 1.247 –.114 .504
(1.021) (1.012) (.385) (1.019) (.629) (.381)
Control for CEO selection .452 .507 .367• .395 .754••• .345•
(.420) (.354) (.200) (.419) (.286) (.202)
Constant –1.712 –1.582 –.464 –2.608 –5.175••• –.654
(2.619) (2.308) (1.148) (2.556) (1.697) (1.150)
CEO-firm-year observations 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333
Number of firms 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105
R2 .098 .096 .120 .100 .136 .121
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To ease interpretation of the table, we did not list all control variables here.
Additional controls included in the models were emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, CEO
founder, CEO gender, board size, percentage of independent directors, and industry and year fixed effects.
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Table 7. Effect of CEO Extraversion on Cumulative Abnormal Return*
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Extraversion .003••
(.001)
Firm size –.003••• –.004•••
(.001) (.001)
Tobin’s Q .001 .001
(.002) (.002)
Cash flow .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Firm performance (ROA) –.007 –.008
(.017) (.017)
Firm debt .001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Firm age –.000 –.000
(.000) (.000)
CEO age .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
CEO tenure .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
CEO ownership –.000 –.000
(.000) (.000)
CEO duality .002 .002
(.002) (.002)
Percentage of female directors –.009 –.009
(.009) (.009)
CEO pay slice –.004 –.003
(.008) (.008)
Past M&A experience .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
CEO pilot license –.005 –.005
(.004) (.004)
CEO overconfidence .000 .000
(.002) (.002)
Cash payment .003• .003•
(.002) (.002)
Tender offer –.001 –.001
(.004) (.004)
Private targets –.003• –.003•
(.002) (.002)
Industry relatedness .002 .002
(.002) (.002)
Deal size (relative to firm size) –.000 –.001
(.004) (.004)
CEO promotion .002• .001
(.001) (.001)
CEO prevention –.001 –.001
(.001) (.001)
CEO relative cash pay (narcissism) .000 .000
(.001) (.001)
CEO relative non-cash pay (narcissism) –.000 –.000
(.000) (.000)
Constant –.004 –.015
(.016) (.023)
Deal observations 3,464 3,464
R2 0.059 0.061
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. To ease interpretation of the table, we did not list all control variables here.
Additional controls included in the models were emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, CEO
founder, CEO gender, board size, percentage of independent directors, and industry and year fixed effects.
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Robustness Tests
The control variables in our models help to rule out several alternative explana-
tions for our results. For example, we ruled out the possibility that the relation-
ship between CEO extraversion and firm M&A behavior is driven by other CEO
personality traits and characteristics examined previously. We also carried out
several additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results. In the existing
models, we partially controlled for CEO narcissism by including relative cash
pay and non-cash pay. For a subsample of S&P 100 firms, we further hand-
collected the remaining three indicators of CEO narcissism: the prominence of
the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual report, the CEO’s prominence
in the company’s press releases, and the CEO’s use of first-person singular
pronouns in interviews (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). We calculated the
composite measure of CEO narcissism based on the five indicators and con-
trolled it in the models of M&A behavior. We included the significant control
variables in the models in addition to the Big Five personality measures. The
relationships between CEO extraversion and the three outcomes remain signifi-
cant and positive.
We also used two alternative measures of risk-taking behavior. First, we
used a standardized return on assets (ROA) ratio in the firm’s sample period
(e.g., John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008). Second, Malmendier and colleagues found
that individuals who grew up during the Great Depression tend to take less risk
in their investment decisions (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) and to follow less
risky corporate strategies (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011), so we used a
dummy variable to identify CEOs who were born between 1920 and 1929. We
included these variables in the main effect models and continued to find signifi-
cant effects of CEO extraversion on firm M&A behavior, suggesting that CEO
risk-taking behavior did not influence our results.
There may be a concern that the value of the dependent variable varies by
year while the CEO personality measure is constant over the entire sampling
period. To ensure that our results were robust for a cross-sectional analysis
involving the entire sampling period, we collapsed the yearly measure and
summed all M&As completed between 2002 and 2013 by each acquiring firm.
We removed observations of firms that experienced a CEO change during the
sampling period. In other words, we tracked the number of M&As made by the
same CEO in each firm for the same number of years. We used the firm-level
control variable values at the beginning of the sampling period (John, Litov, and
Yeung, 2008). Again, we continued to find a significant and positive relationship
between CEO extraversion and M&A behavior over the entire sample period.
Finally, we also re-ran our models with two split-period measures of CEO extra-
version (2002–2007 and 2008–2012); our results remained robust.
DISCUSSION
We sought to understand and examine the role of CEOs’ extraversion in
explaining firms’ M&A behavior, and our findings—after controlling for a large
number of personality traits and other CEO characteristics—provide compelling
evidence that CEO extraversion matters. Extraverted CEOs are more likely to
engage in M&As, do so more frequently, and also conduct larger M&As than
less extraverted CEOs. The effect is substantial and economically significant.
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An increase in CEO extraversion from one standard deviation below the mean
to one standard deviation above the mean increases the odds of making an
M&A by 11.2 percent per year, increases the frequency of M&As by 13 percent
per year, and increases the size of M&As by 6.7 percent per year.
We argued that extraverted CEOs acquire more because they are inclined to
seek and enjoy large-scale growth opportunities, spot acquisitive growth oppor-
tunities and view them more positively, and transform these opportunities into
collective action. An important mechanism through which these effects materi-
alize is the tendency for extraverts to have larger instrumental networks (Fang
et al., 2015), have a stronger desire to be differentiated members of these net-
works, and use them more actively than other CEOs do (e.g., Costa and
McCrae, 1985; Forret and Dougherty, 2001). We found strong support that this
instrumental network role explains the relationship between CEOs’ extraver-
sion and M&A behavior. Extraverted CEOs are more likely to have larger board
networks, which partially explains the likelihood of acquiring and fully explains
the likelihood of making larger, more consequential M&As.
Strategic management scholars have increasingly stressed the role of CEO
personality, but scant research has investigated when it matters. Building on
rich personality research in the psychology literature, we considered whether
the influence of personality depends on the extent to which situations constrain
people from acting according to their own preferences (Mischel, 1977a, 1977b;
Barrick and Mount, 1993). We found that situational strength indeed plays an
important role in whether CEO extraversion explains M&A behavior. In highly
competitive industries, in which M&A behavior is the norm rather than a prefer-
ence, the situation, rather than personality, seems to dictate M&A behavior. In
contrast, in weakly competitive industries, CEO personality explains much
more of firms’ M&A behavior. We also found that the more CEOs are unfet-
tered by corporate governance rules and processes, as expressed by higher
managerial entrenchment scores, the more CEOs’ personalities are likely to
affect M&A behavior.
The role of situational strength adds nuance to the claim that top executives
influence organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Quigley, 2014; Quigley and
Hambrick, 2015). Upper echelon scholars view the firm as a reflection of its top
management and emphasize the influence of the implied or explicit prefer-
ences of CEOs and their immediate associates. At least in the case of CEO
extraversion, the extent to which the firm becomes a reflection of its CEO’s
personality depends on whether the firm happens to be in a weak situation.
Scholars advocating a population ecology or institutional view tend to view
executives as being constrained by conventions and norms set by external
forces that determine how their firms evolve and adapt (e.g., Hannan and
Freeman, 1977; Di-Maggio and Powell, 1983). Our study suggests that this
may also be the case but only in strong situations.
Finally, we found that shareholders generally react more positively to
announcements of M&As that are made by extraverted CEOs. A one-standard-
deviation increase in CEO extraversion increases the abnormal stock returns
upon M&A announcements by .2 percent, which translates to a $14.7 million
gain for the shareholders of an average acquirer in our sample. Positive reac-
tions may stem from extraverted CEOs’ ability to identify and complete higher-
quality M&As through their more extensive board networks or from their ability
to convince shareholders of the value that they can reap through M&As. This
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finding is revealing, particularly considering that shareholders tend to suffer
losses following M&As (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1992; Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz, 2005). Moreover, this finding places CEOs’ extraversion in stark con-
trast with other personality traits that have been considered before: CEOs’
hubris leads to higher M&A premiums, which negatively influence sharehold-
ers’ reactions (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), and CEOs’ narcissism leads to
irregular performance (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) and, in combination with
social praise, leads to higher M&A premiums (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011).
Our finding addresses the performance implications of CEOs’ regulatory focus.
Given the significant relationship between extraversion and promotion focus
(Gorman et al., 2012), the positive shareholder reactions to M&As undertaken
by extraverted CEOs may in part be explained by their promotion focus.
Although in the control model CEO promotion focus is positively related to
cumulative abnormal returns, the significance disappears when adding CEO
extraversion.
In this study, we examined the role of CEOs’ extraversion using powerful lin-
guistics software. Computational linguistics is a rapidly developing field, and
techniques used to recognize personality traits from texts are improving con-
tinuously. The method developed by Mairesse et al. (2007) is currently consid-
ered to be the state-of-the-art (Celli and Rossi, 2015). Though it is new to
management research, computational linguistics is being used in an increas-
ingly wide range of textual contexts such as Twitter conversations (Lima and
De Castro, 2014; Celli and Rossi, 2015), Facebook posts (He et al., 2014), blogs
(e.g., Iacobelli et al., 2011), job application texts (Faliagka et al., 2014), and
broadcast news (Alam and Riccardi, 2014). We hope that our study encourages
more scholars to adopt these novel methodologies to explore the psychological
foundation of strategy that can be very difficult to examine through surveys or
remote proxies.
We controlled for self-selection bias by estimating a pooled sample regres-
sion model, using CEO extraversion as the dependent variable. This analysis
resulted in findings that resonate with extant research on extraversion. For
example, in agreement with other studies that used different methodologies,
we find that CEO extraversion is related to other personality dimensions (e.g.,
Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). Also, in agreement with findings on a more
general population, we find similar effects of the roles of age (e.g., Viken et al.,
1994), American nationality (e.g., Cattel and Warburton, 1961), and gender
(e.g., Watkins, 1976): the extraverted CEOs in our sample were more likely to
be young American males.
Limitations and Future Research
The focus and analysis of our methods have a number of limitations. First, the
strength of the CEO extraversion measure depends on the extent to which the
linguistic programs and algorithm fit the population of CEOs. Mairesse et al.
(2007) developed and tested their method thoroughly and provided strong sup-
port for its validity, but they did so with the purpose of assessing the extraver-
sion of a more general population. Although we performed several conclusive
validations, the algorithms could be improved further to fit the CEO population
if it becomes possible to tap into other sources of CEO extraversion (e.g., sur-
vey reports) among a wide group of CEOs. Moreover, the measure we used
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depends on the appropriateness of the spoken text that is considered. The con-
ference calls we examined seem to be suitable, as scholars have found that it
is easier to differentiate between more and less extraverted people when texts
are spoken during more complex tasks, as anxiety levels are likely to be higher
(Dewaele and Furnham, 1999). We used the Q&A section, which we assumed
to be unscripted, so that we could be more confident that we coded the CEOs’
own words. Yet our findings are limited by the fact that we cannot completely
rule out that others may have coached or even scripted possible answers that
CEOs gave.
Second, we focused on the personality of CEOs, who arguably play the
most central role in firms’ strategic decision making. But CEOs generally do
not come to these decisions on their own; they rely on top management
teams, as well as other internal and external advisors. Therefore it would be
interesting to also consider the role of personality traits of CEOs’ close associ-
ates. For example, the role of CEOs’ extraversion might depend on the level of
proactivity or extraversion of their direct associates (cf. Grant, Gino, and
Hoffman, 2011).
Third, to determine whether the role of CEOs’ extraversion influences M&A
behavior above and beyond other CEO personality traits and characteristics that
have been the focus of previous research, we included a large number of con-
trol variables, such as CEO risk taking, power, hubris, narcissism, and regula-
tory focus, all of which have received recent scholarly attention (e.g., Hayward
and Hambrick, 1997; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Gamache et al., 2015).
But still other personality traits may also affect M&A behavior and are
extremely difficult to assess for the large sample of CEOs we considered. For
example, scholars have found that an internal locus of control may be related
to risk taking (Miller, de Vries, and Toulouse, 1982) and small firms’ perfor-
mance (Boone, Brabander, and van Witteloostuijn, 1996), and Morrisson (1997)
found that extraversion is significantly related to locus of control among a more
general population. Future research can examine whether the effects we
observe can be explained in part by a CEO’s locus of control.
Fourth, we recognize that conference calls may be limited in the extent to
which they capture all personality traits and that they may be better suited for
recognizing variation in extraversion rather than the other traits. We cannot rule
out that other personality traits may be somewhat suppressed under confer-
ence call conditions. Future research should further improve the algorithm to
examine and validate the extent to which it captures CEOs’ extraversion, as
well as the other Big Five dimensions. In a similar vein, important progress can
be made in training the algorithm so that it not only measures extraversion in
general but also can distinguish between agentic and affiliative aspects of
extraversion. Fifth, although our results reveal a substantial economic effect of
CEOs’ extraversion on firms’ M&A behavior, and we included a large number
of explanatory variables, a large amount of variance still remains unexplained.
Finally, our study finds preliminary evidence that CEOs’ extraversion leads to
more positive M&A performance, as indicated by positive shareholder reac-
tions. To gain a better understanding of the influence on M&A performance,
future research might explore critical mediating mechanisms, such as whether
extraverted CEOs are better at motivating stakeholders toward M&As, retain-
ing CEOs of their acquired firms, or uniting organization members across for-
mer firm boundaries following post-merger integration. With the continued
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development of programming skills and technologies, the field is rife with
opportunities to further address whether, why, when, and how CEOs’ extraver-
sion matters to firms.
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